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CORPORATE TAXATION AND THE SIZE OF









Using a novel country-industry level panel database with information on newly incorporated
firms in 17 European countries between 1997 and 2004, we study how taxation of corporate
income affects the size of entrants at the country-industry level. Our results, which are robust
to changes in several assumptions, suggest that a one-unit reduction in the effective corporate
income tax rate leads to a reduction of entrants’ capital size that ranges from 2.7% to 14.4%.
Results on labor size are more mixed in terms of both sign and size. These findings imply that
a reduction in corporate taxation reduces the capital to labor ratio. (JEL: C23, H32, L26, L51,
M13)
1. Introduction
In virtually all countries, public policy aims at fostering entrepreneurship by
encouraging the formation of new companies in order to stimulate innovation,
competition, employment, and economic growth. Studies that evaluate such poli-
cies abound, and a recent strand of literature exploits the increasing availability
of firm-level data to assess how different labor, credit, and product market reg-
ulations affect entry and the characteristics of entrants and incumbents. This
literature has paid little attention to corporate tax policy. This omission is striking,
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since flexibility and ease of implementation make taxation an appealing policy
instrument for encouraging the formation of entrepreneurial companies.1
In Da Rin, Di Giacomo, and Sembenelli (2009) we analyze how corporate
taxation affects entry rates (the “extensive margin”). In this study we shift the
analysis to the size of entrants, measured by capital, labor, and their ratio (the
“intensive margin”). Both effects are policy-relevant. The effect on the extensive
margin reflects an economy’s ability to create growth opportunities. The effect on
the intensive margin reflects both the quality and the speed of growth (see Ardagna
and Lusardi 2009, 2010; Kerr and Nanda 2009, 2010). The contribution of each
effect to economic growth is an empirical issue, whose analysis is important for
a correct design of economic policies.
The theoretical literature on corporate taxation has identified several possible
(countervailing) channels that may link tax policy to the characteristics of entrants
(see Section 2). The net sign and size of these effects are however ambiguous,
and remain an empirical question.
Our aim is to empirically investigate these channels in a panel data setting,
which helps to overcome the weaknesses of purely cross-sectional studies. Our
data consist of a novel firm-level data set covering 17 European countries between
1997 and 2004. The different evolution of tax policies over time in Europe pro-
vides a good source of identification for our empirical exercise. Several countries
reduced statutory tax rates during the last decade, while also changing the effective
tax base, thus creating a variety of situations which we exploit econometrically.
Our analysis recognizes that taxation is likely to react to business conditions,
and therefore cannot be treated as an exogenous policy instrument. For this, we
exploit the panel structure by controlling for time, country, and industry fixed
effects, and also introduce a set of instruments to help address the endogeneity
of taxation. Any instrumental variable can be criticized and needs to rely on
convincing economic arguments; for this we offer some rationale (Section 4.1)
and a set of tests that support the validity—but less so the relevance—of our
instruments (Section 4.2).
Across a range of linear and quadratic specifications, with and without instru-
mentation, we find that a one-unit reduction in the effective corporate income tax
rate leads to a reduction of entrants’ capital size that ranges from 2.7% to 14.4%.
Its effect on labor size is smaller and even has the opposite sign for a relevant
portion of the empirical distribution of tax rates. As a consequence, a reduction
of taxation unambiguosly implies a reduction of the capital–labor ratio. These
results are consistent with the predictions of the model by Cullen and Gordon
(2007).
More generally, a possible interpretation of our results is that the taxation
constitutes a barrier to entry: as found by Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2006),
1. Djankov et al. (2008) and Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2006) are the only exceptions we are
aware of.
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high entry costs may make entry attractive only for larger firms. Together with
the finding that lower corporate taxation increases entry rates that we develop in
Da Rin, Di Giacomo, and Sembenelli (2009), the results of this paper point to
a policy trade-off between inducing more entry but of smaller, less capitalized
firms that warrants further investigation.
2. Theoretical Framework
We base our analysis on the framework built by Cullen and Gordon (2007), which
provides a synthesis of previous models of the effects of taxation on the decision
of entry (by incorporation), on the scale of the firm, and on its capital–labor
ratio. The decision they study is that of an entrepreneur who chooses whether
to set up her firm as an incorporated or un-incorporated entity.2 They identify
three channels through which corporate income taxation affects the incorporation
decision and the optimal choice of scale.
The first channel (“income shifting”) consists of the possibility to shift
income between the personal and the corporate tax bases to take advantage of
the (typically positive) difference between personal and corporate tax rates; this
encourages entry by incorporation when expected income is sufficiently high,
since un-incorporated firms are mostly taxed at (progressive) personal rates. This
channel is stronger the larger the firm’s scale.
The second channel (“risk subsidy”) arises from the contrast between (pro-
gressive) personal income tax rates and (flat) corporate income tax rates. This
makes expected tax liabilities fall as the entrepreneur undertakes riskier projects,
providing a tax subsidy to entry by incorporation. The subsidy exists irrespec-
tive of risk attitudes, and is greater the larger the firm’s scale. It depends on the
riskiness of the project, the progressiveness of personal income tax rates, and the
structure of corporate taxation.
The third channel (“risk-sharing”) operates when financial market imper-
fections prevent full risk-sharing with investors. In this case higher tax rates
encourage entry at a higher scale because it allows entrepreneurs to share
entrepreneurial risk with the government.
To link these three channels to the effects of corporate taxation on the intensive
margin of entry, consider the following. Higher corporate income tax rates lead
to a lower capital scale of entrants through the “income shifting” and the “risk
subsidy” channels, but make risk-taking more attractive via the “risk-sharing”
channel, leading to larger capital size of entrants. The net effect depends on the
relative sizes of these offsetting channels. Because labor costs are deductible
2. Not all new companies that survive choose incorporation, and studies document that the
incorporation decision is a genuine choice.
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expenses rather than foregone income of the entrepreneur, labor size is instead
affected only by the “risk subsidy” and “risk-sharing” channels. Also in this case
the net effect is a priori undetermined; it is expected to be weaker than in the
case of capital size, and could even become negative. Higher corporate taxation
is expected to increase the capital–labor ratio because hiring new workers does
not create income-shifting benefits, unlike expanding a firm’s capital size.
Two implications are relevant for our analysis. First, the sign and size of the
effect of a change in corporate income taxation on the size of entrants are not
a priori clear. Second, as we explain in Da Rin, Di Giacomo, and Sembenelli
(2009), the effect is unlikely to be constant across different values of the effective
tax rate, and one could expect nonlinear effects.
3. Data and Variables
We take our dependent variables from yearly editions of the Amadeus database,
published by Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing. We collect data on indi-
vidual companies from 17 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). We
include companies that incorporated between 1997 and 2004 and were active in
39 industries. We use information from Amadeus to build our two dependent
variables.
The initial capital size of entrants (Capital-Size) is given by the median value,
at country-industry level, of entrants’ (log transformed) total assets in the year after
incorporation. The initial labor size of entrants (Labor-Size) is given by the median
number, at country-industry level, of entrants’ (log transformed) employees in the
year after incorporation.
Table 1 reports some figures about the composition of our sample of more
than 2.5 million entrants. About 2 million of them report information on Capital-
Size, and data on Labor-Size are available for less than one million companies.
Over time, we observe an increasing number of entrants with a decreasing size,
especially after 2001.3
Da Rin, Di Giacomo, and Sembenelli (2009) describe in more detail these
data and the construction of our independent variables: taxation and business
policy. For corporate taxation we build the “effective average tax rate” (Effec-
tive Tax Rate) using the methodology proposed by Devereux and Griffith (1998)
and information from the Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide published by Ernst
& Young, a multinational tax consulting firm. Effective Tax Rate is a nonlinear
3. This may be due to more refined data collection practices, or to complex industry and country
dynamics. Because we are unable to disentangle these effects, relying on panel data is reassuring,
since it allows us to control for changes in data collection practices both over time and across
countries.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics (firm-level).
Capital-Size Labor-Size
Entrants Average Median Entrants Average Median
Year Entrants with data value value with data value value
1997 131,812 96,765 3,970.08 148.50 63,326 52.79 3.00
1998 244,339 197,286 5,369.80 70.91 75,918 32.77 3.00
1999 281,266 228,353 5,261.95 78.49 88,599 32.60 3.00
2000 305,204 243,244 6,300.46 76.03 90,963 35.64 3.00
2001 301,859 245,815 4,925.00 77.57 90,830 25.39 3.00
2002 369,899 315,862 2,391.11 64.12 100,728 19.14 3.00
2003 437,146 378,027 2,223.85 47.96 102,253 16.08 2.00
2004 446,811 363,761 2,585.50 72.00 110,975 17.48 2.00
Total 2,518,336 2,069,113 3,830.03 70.30 723,592 27.34 3.00
Note: Capital-Size and Labor-Size are the value of total assets and the total number of employees (respectively) of
entrants in the year after incorporation. Year is year of incorporation. Figures are in numbers, except for average and
median values of Capital-Size (in thousands of euros, deflated using the HCPI index by Eurostat).
function of the statutory tax rate, that varies across countries and time, and of the
expected rate of return, that varies across industries and time. Our second inde-
pendent variable, Pro-Business Policy Index, is the Index of Economic Freedom
published yearly by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal. We use
this measure to account for a country’s policy toward new business creation.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship
between Effective Tax Rate and entrants’ size. It suggests a positive relationship
in the case of Capital-Size, but not for Labor-Size.
4. Empirical Analysis
4.1. Econometric Strategy
We estimate two different specifications of the following relationship:
yict = αt + g(Taxict−1)′γ + xct−1β + ηic + εict , (1)
Table 2. Descriptive statistics (industry-country-year level).
Variable Average S.D. 25th perc. Median 75th perc. No. Obs.
Capital-Size 5.37 1.06 4.65 5.17 5.97 3,446
Labor-Size 1.50 0.81 1.04 1.39 1.95 3,214
Effective Tax Rate 30.16 4.97 27.70 30.21 33.59 3,446
Pro-Business Policy Index 68.87 5.59 65.40 68.60 72.80 3,446
Note: Capital-Size and Labor-Size are computed as the median (within a specific country-industry-year) of the log
transformation of the value of total assets and of the total number of employees (respectively) of entrants in the year
after incorporation. The Effective Tax Rate is the “effective average tax rate” as defined by Devereux and Griffith (1998)
and it is expressed in percentage. The Pro-Business Policy Index is the Index of Economic Freedom published yearly
by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal. The index ranges from 0 (minimum economic freedom) to 100
(maximum economic freedom).
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Figure 1. Capital-Size, Labor-Size, and Effective Tax Rate: a graphical view.
The figures plot Capital-Size and Labor-Size against the (lagged) Effective Tax Rate. All
observations refer to country-industry-year level data.
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where yict is one of our two dependent variables, Capital-Size and Labor-Size,
both measured in year t , industry i, and country c. Taxict−1, the lagged value of
Effective Tax Rate, varies across time, industries, and countries. The variable αt
is a time effect that we model with a set of year dummies, and xct−1 is the (lagged)
Pro-Business Policy Index, which varies across time and countries.
The last two terms in equation (1) are unobservable error components. The
term ηic is a time-invariant, country–industry specific effect that captures any
unobserved characteristics that are relevant for the entry and the scale decisions.
Because our explanatory variables may be correlated with ηic, we use the standard
‘within-group’ transformation to remove it. The term εict is an idiosyncratic error
term that varies across the three dimensions of our panel data set. We report
standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and intra-country correlation
of unrestricted form.
To consistently estimate γ and β, once the model has been transformed in
deviations from country–industry means, we need lack of correlation between
the regressors and εict at all leads and lags. Under this assumption the standard
within-group, or panel fixed effects (FE), estimator is consistent and asymptoti-
cally normally distributed. Because this strong exogeneity assumption is not fully
convincing in our setting, we alternatively use a set of instruments to deal with
the potential endogeneity of Effective Tax Rate (and also of Pro-Business Policy
Index). For this, we borrow from the political economy literature four measures
of the political process: the ideological orientation of the government (Center-
Left Government, a dummy for center-left chief executive party, from the World
Bank’s Database of Political Institutions); the degree of political veto power
(Veto-Power Index, a count of the number of political parties in the coalition,
from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions); the perceived stabil-
ity of the government (Government-Stability Index, a survey measure from the
International Country Risk Guide); and Election-Date, a dummy equal to one in
election years. These instruments are selected on the basis of appropriate spec-
ification tests for instrument validity (Hansen J and C statistics) and relevancy
(Cragg-Donald and Kleibergen-Paap tests). Their economic rationale is that both
some structural features of the political process (such as the degree of political
veto power or election dates) and the outcomes of the process (such as govern-
ment stability) are likely to affect the implementation of fiscal reforms without
directly affecting entering entrepreneurs’ decisions on the scale of their firms.
4.2. Results
Tables 3 and 4 report our empirical results. For both Capital-Size and Labor-Size
we present four estimated equations, each based on different functional forms
and estimation methods. Columns (1) and (2) report a linear specification in the
tax rate, estimated with panel FE and with GMM-IV. Columns (3) and (4) report
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Table 3. Estimation results. Dependent variable: Capital-Size.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FE GMM-IV FE GMM-IV FIRST-STAGE
Effective Tax Rate 0.027∗∗ 0.144∗∗ 0.009 0.944∗
(0.012) (0.066) (0.027) (0.552)
Effective Tax Rate - Squared 0.000 −0.013
(0.000) (0.009)
Pro-Business Policy Index 0.008 0.045 0.009 0.051 −0.362∗∗∗









Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald Test Statistic 5.37 6.20
degrees of freedom [p-value] 2 [0.07] 2 [0.05]
Hansen J Statistic 2.58 0.51
degrees of freedom [p-value] 3 [0.46] 2 [0.77]
Endogeneity Test (Hansen C Statistic) 1.14 0.10
degrees of freedom [p-value] 1 [0.29] 1 [0.75]
Cragg-Donald Statistic 109.64 31.26
Kleibergen-Paap Statistic 3.67 1.43
Observations 3,446 3,446 3,446 3,446 3,446
Note: In columns (1) through (4) the dependent variable is Capital-Size, defined as the median (within a country-
industry-year) of the log transformation of the value of total assets. The specifications in columns (1), (3), and (5) are
panel fixed effects regressions. Columns (2) and (4) are GMM instrumental variables regressions, where Effective Tax
Rate and its square are instrumented. Column (5) shows the first stage regression where the dependent variable is the
Effective Tax Rate. The Wald Test is a test on the joint significance of Effective Tax Rate and Effective Tax Rate–Squared.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity and intra-country correlation of unrestricted form.
∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
a more general quadratic specification, also estimated with panel FE and with
GMM-IV. Column (5) of Table 3 reports the pseudo first stage for Effective Tax
Rate.4
In the linear specification for Capital-Size the coefficient of taxation is pos-
itive and significant at conventional levels with both estimation methods. The
GMM-IV coefficient (0.144) is substantially larger than the panel FE one (0.027).
Because the estimates represent semi-elasticities, a one-unit increase in Effective
Tax Rate increases Capital-Size by an amount ranging from 2.7% (column (1))
to 14.4% (column (2)). This large difference in magnitude is consistent with a
violation of the strict exogeneity assumption or an attenuation bias, both affecting
the panel FE estimates. However, it might also reflect a weak instrument problem
4. We do not report the pseudo first stage results in Table 4 because they are substantially identical
to those in Table 3, except for a different number of observations.
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Table 4. Estimation results. Dependent variable: Labor-Size.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FE GMM-IV FE GMM-IV
Effective Tax Rate −0.008 0.033 0.046∗ 0.613
(0.005) (0.022) (0.025) (0.433)
Effective Tax Rate - Squared −0.001∗∗ −0.009
(0.000) (0.006)
Pro-Business Policy Index 0.002 0.017 0.001 0.019
(0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.014)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald Test Statistic 5.61 3.57
degrees of freedom [p-value] 2 [0.07] 2 [0.17]
Hansen J Statistic 2.01 0.03
degrees of freedom [p-value] 3 [0.57] 2 [0.93]
Endogeneity Test (Hansen C Statistic) 0.59 0.02
degrees of freedom [p-value] 1 [0.44] 1 [0.88]
Cragg-Donald Statistic 135.91 13.13
Kleibergen-Paap Statistic 3.12 2.62
Observations 3,214 3,214 3,214 3,214
Note: The dependent variable is Labor-Size, defined as the median (within a country-industry-year) of the log transfor-
mation of the number of employees. The specifications in columns (1) and (3) are panel fixed effects regressions. Columns
(2) and (4) are GMM instrumental variables regressions, where Effective Tax Rate and its square are instrumented. The
Wald Test is a test on the joint significance of Effective Tax Rate and Effective Tax Rate–Squared. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity and intra-country correlation of unrestricted form.
∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
in the GMM-IV estimates, as signalled by the Kleibergen-Paap (but not by the
Cragg-Donald) statistic. The large size of the GMM-IV estimates seems to sup-
port this latter conjecture. Comfortingly, the validity of our set of instruments is
not rejected by the data (Hansen’s J statistic), that also support the exogeneity of
Pro-Business Policy Index (Hansen’s C statistic).
Based on Cullen and Gordon (2007), who identify several reasons for non-
linearities in the relationship between the corporate tax rate and entry size; we
then estimate a quadratic specification. With panel FE the linear and the quadratic
terms are individually insignificant at any conventional significance level, and a
Wald joint test on these terms rejects the null hypothesis of joint insignificance,
but only at the 10% level. With GMM-IV, the linear term is positive and highly
significant, and the quadratic term is negative and only marginally significant
(p-value of 0.14). The Wald test rejects the hypothesis of their joint insignifi-
cance at the 5% level. Moreover, both the validity of our set of instruments and
the exogeneity of Pro-Business Policy Index are not rejected by the data at the 1%
level of significance (Hansen’s J and C statistics). Computed at the median, a unit
increase in Effective Tax Rate increases Capital-Size by 18.3% in the quadratic
GMM-IV specification, a value similar to that obtained from the GMM-IV linear
specification. Overall, the evidence presented so far points clearly to a smaller
capital size of entrants as the tax burden lowers.
Table 4 replicates the same estimation strategy for Labor-Size. In the linear
panel FE specification the coefficient is negative, statistically insignificant, and
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economically negligible (−0.008). The GMM-IV estimate is instead positive,
larger (0.033), but statistically insignificant. A weaker effect than for Capital-
Size is what one would expect based on Cullen and Gordon’s predictions. As for
Capital-Size, the Hansen’s C test does not reject the exogeneity of Pro-Business
Policy Index.
When we allow for a more flexible (quadratic) functional form, the valid-
ity of our set of instruments and the exogeneity of Pro-Business Policy Index
are not rejected by the data. The coefficients of the linear and of the quadratic
terms are positively and negatively signed, respectively, regardless of the esti-
mation method. When computed at the median, a unit increase in Effective Tax
Rate reduces Labor-Size by 0.6% with the panel FE estimation (column (3)); the
implied curvature leads to an effect that is positive only up to the first decile of the
distribution of Effective Tax Rate (24.8%). Contrary to Capital-Size, therefore,
taxation has a negative effect on Labor-Size for a sizeable part of its distribution.
In the GMM-IV specification the two terms retain their signs but are insignifi-
cant, both individually and jointly. Overall, these results preclude us from taking
a strong stand on the role of corporate taxation on Labor-Size.
Finally, our results that the effect of taxation on Labor-Size is smaller than
on Capital-Size imply that lower corporate tax rates lead to a lower capital/labor
ratio, as suggested by Cullen and Gordon’s model.5
4.3. Robustness
We check the robustness of our results against three sets of assumptions. In all
cases the effect of taxation on entry size retains its magnitude. First, we experiment
with alternative measures of the dependent variables, computing Capital-Size and
Labor-Size as averages instead of medians. Second, we change the assumptions
underlying the computation of Effective Tax Rate. These include alternative com-
position of the investment in terms of asset type, the way the new company is
financed, and a wide range of alternative economic depreciation rates. Finally,
even if our endogeneity tests do not reject the null of exogeneity for Pro-Business
Policy Index, we run additional GMM-IV estimates, where Pro-Business Policy
Index is treated as endogenous and instrumented with the same variables used for
Effective Tax Rate and Effective Tax Rate Squared.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we empirically investigate the relationship between effective corpo-
rate income taxation and the size of entrants, using a panel data set that allows
5. The estimation of a set of equations with the capital–labor ratio as dependent variable confirms
this conclusion.
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us to improve significantly on the existing literature. We find consistent evidence
that a lower corporate income taxation decreases the capital size of entrants and
their capital to labor ratio. This suggests that policymakers should consider that
lowering taxes may enhance entry rates (as we show in Da Rin, Di Giacomo, and
Sembenelli [2009]) but that also induces the entry of smaller, less capitalized, and
therefore weaker firms.
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